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11 Introduction
In this paper, we construct a simple model to analyze the network eﬀect of
raising children. Networks among parents seem to play an important role in
determining the cost of child rearing for individual families. For instance, the
existence of such network would facilitate helping each other and exchanging
information. We adopt a static partial equilibrium model, and show that the
network eﬀect may magnify the decline of “birthrate”, i.e., the number of
children in each household.
We also extend the partial equilibrium model to a general equilibrium
setting. By using this extended model, we consider a small open economy
that is allowed to trade consumption goods and capital with the rest of the
world. We examine how the reduction in the size of population aﬀects the
supply side of this economy and the choice of fertility in each household.
There are many theoretical studies on fertility and population. Among
them, this paper is related to Becker and Barro (1988). They develop a model
of fertility choices, in which the opportunity costs of child-rearing plays a
crucial role in determining the optimal choice of fertility. This paper builds
on their work, but we incorporate the network eﬀect of raising children into
the model. As a result, we can analyze the fertility choice of each households
in the presence of the network-eﬀect of child-rearing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop a
partial equilibrium model with network eﬀect of child-rearing. We examine
the eﬀect of wage and population on the equilibrium number of children. We
also show that the equilibrium number of children is insuﬃcient as compared
to the social optimum. In Section 3, we extend the model to a general
equilibrium setting and examine the free trade equilibrium in a small open
economy. In Section 4, we close this paper with a brief summary.
2 A Simple Model with Network Eﬀect
Let us consider a simple model of fertility choice. There are N identical
households in an economy. They enjoy raising children as well as consuming
1a good. Let n denote the number of children and c denote the consumption





where θ ∈ (0,1). Each household has one unit of time and allocates its time
to earning wages and rasing children. We assume that each child costs β in
time, and thus nβ is the total time cost of raising children. In addition to
its time, each household is endowed with k units of capital. Let w denote
the wage rate and r denote the (gross) rental rate of capital. The budget
constraint for each household is
c + wβn = w + rk. (1)
Note that the price of the consumption good equals one since it is nemeraire.
Each household maximizes the utility function subject to the budget con-
straint. Let un and uc denote the partial derivatives of u with respect to n







The higher wage rate leads to the larger opportunity cost of raising children.
Thus, as the wage rate increases, the number of children per consumption
good, n/c, declines in each household. The choice of fertility also depends on
the time cost of rasing children β. An increase in β implies that it is more
time-consuming to raise children. Thus, a larger β leads to smaller number
of children per consumption good, n/c, in each household.
2.0.1 The Network Eﬀect
We take the view that there are networks among parents having children,
and the networks can play an important role in determining the cost of
rasing children. For instance, in a city with a large population of families,
parents may help each other when their children are sick but they cannot
2be absent from work. Parents can also exchange information about raising
children such as the quality of a day-care center or a pediatrician. This kind
of network would facilitate raising children for each household by lowering
the cost of raising children. Also, the network eﬀect would be stronger as
the population size of families becomes larger.
There also may be other reasons why cost of raising children decreases
with number of children. When there are many children, there will be more
doctors, day-care, and other service providers for children. Transportation
cost would be lower as distribution of service providers become more dense.
One can also argue search costs would decline but this eﬀect may be indis-
tinguishable from the aforementioned network eﬀect.
We now introduce the network eﬀect of raising children into the model.
For this purpose, let β = β(Nn) and β′(Nn) < 0 i.e. the cost of raising
children negatively depends on the total number of children in the economy.
We also assume that each household does not recognize the network eﬀect,
that is, it is a kind of a positive externality.
Using the budget constraint (1) and ﬁrst order condition (2), we can





If β is constant, the demand for children is determined for the given values
of w and r. However, β is not constant in the presence of the network eﬀect
since it depends on the total number of children. For the simpliﬁcation of




where α ∈ (0,1) and β > 0. Clearly, β is decreasing in the total number of
children. It can be shown that β is convex in n since
d2β
dn2 > 0. For the given
wage and rental rate, the number of children and the cost of raising children
are determined by the two equations (3) and (4). Let ne and βe denote the





















Figure 1 shows the determination of equilibrium values of n and β. At the
equilibrium point (ne,βe), the curve of the demand for children is steeper
than that of the cost of raising children. This case is guaranteed by the
assumption that α is smaller than 1 in the cost function (4). Under this
assumption, it can be show that the equilibrium is stable. To conﬁrm this
point, let us consider the following two scenarios.
2.1 The Adjustment Process of Birthrate
Suppose that the cost of child rearing is given by a > βe in Figure 2. For this
value of the cost, the number of children chosen by each household is n(a).
However, when the number of children per household is n(a), the actual cost
of child rearing is β(n(a)) due to the network externality. Since β(n(a)) is
smaller than a, each household would increase the the number of children.
Again, β declines due to the increase in n, and so on. This process continues
until the equilibrium is reached. If the cost of raising children is higher than
the equilibrium value, the number of children per household would increase
in the adjustment process.
In contrast, suppose that the cost of child rearing is given by b < βe in
Figure 2. For each household, it is optimal to choose n(b). For this number
of children, the network eﬀect is too weak to keep the cost of child rearing
as low as b. As a result, the cost rises up to β(n(b)), under which each
household chooses the smaller number of children. Then, the decline in n
raises β further more, and this process continues until the equilibrium is
reached. If the cost of raising children is smaller than the equilibrium value,
each household would reduce the number of children during the adjustment
process.
42.2 The Eﬀect of the Wage Rate
Let us examine the impact of a wage increase on the number of children
in each household. If the wage rate increases, then the opportunity cost of
child rearing would rise. Thus, each household would choose to have fewer
children. This is conﬁrmed by dne
dw < 0. The point is that the network
externality can magnify the impact of the wage increase. In Figure 3, the
curve of the demand for children shifts down due to an increase in the wage
rate. If there were no network eﬀect, the cost of child rearing would be
constant, and thus the decline in the number of children would be smaller
than that in the presence of the network eﬀect. This implies that the network
eﬀect will magnify a decline in “birthrate”.
2.3 The Eﬀect of the Number of Households
Let us turn to a change in the number of households. In Figure 4, a fall in
N shifts the curve of the cost of child rearing upward, and thus the num-
ber of children per household would decline. The reason is straightforward.
The decline in the number of households weakens the network eﬀect of child
rearing, and increasing the cost of raising children. It is worth noting that
this eﬀect does not appear in the absence of the network eﬀect. This result
also implies that a decline in the number of households reduces more than
proportionally the total number of children in the economy.
2.4 Socially Optimal Number of Children
We determine the relationship between the equilibrium and socially optimal
number of children. Since all households are identical, social welfare is,
W(n,c) = Nu(n,c).
The resource constraint is simply N times 1) with β replaced by the function







= wβ(Nn) + wβ
′(Nn)N. (5)
Since β′(Nn) < 0, comparison with (2) shows that the positive externality
actually makes the cost of an extra child smaller. Using the explicit formu-




+ αN(1 − θ). (6)
The second term utilizes
β






Unlike (3), this is an implicit demand function of n. It does show the rela-
tionship between n and the value of β. This is depicted in dotted lines in
Figure 1. We can see that the socially optimal number of children n∗ is more
than ne and the corresponding cost will be lower, β∗ < βe.
2.5 Optimal Subsidy
In this section, we analyze the government’s optimal subsidy. Suppose that
the government provides a subsidy s per child and levies a lump-sum tax t
on income. Then, the budget constraint for each household is
c + (wβ − s)n = w + rk − t.
Under this budget constraint, each household maximizes the utility. It can
be shown that the ﬁrst order condition is
θc
(1 − θ)n
= wβ − s.
The subsidy stimulates the demand for children by reducing the cost of child-
rearing. By using the ﬁrst order condition with the budget constraint, we
6can obtain the following condition:
nβ =






Under the subsidy, the demand for children must satisfy this condition. The
balanced budget condition for the government implies that
Nsn = Nt.
With this condition, we can rearrange (7) as
nβ =






In the previous section, we derived the optimal condition (6). We can






+ αN(1 − θ)β
∗. (9)
If the government chooses the subsidy optimally, then (n∗,β∗) must satisfy











+ αN(1 − θ)β
∗.







where the second equality is obtained by (5). We can show that the optimal
subsidy is positively related to the wage rate. In Figure 1, an increase in
the wage rate shifts the dotted line upward, and thus the optimal number of
children falls. Then, we can easily see that an increase in wage rate raises
the optimal subsidy. The intuition is straightforward. A rise in the wage
rate increases the opportunity costs for child-rearing. Thus, the government
must provide the larger subsidy to stimulate birthrate.
73 Globalization and Population
In this section, we turn to the link between “globalization” and population.
For this purpose, we extend the previous model to a general equilibrium set-
ting. “Globalization” means the integration of the domestic good and capital
markets to the world markets. First, we show that, in a globalized economy,
declining population may “hollow out” the economy due to a reduction in the
labor supply, but such a “shortage” of the labor supply may not be recovered
because of a further reduction in birthrate. Second, we show that a surge in
foreign investment may reduce the output of domestic production, but such
“hollowing out” may have a positive impact on population.
3.1 A General Equilibrium Model
The model can be extended to a general equilibrium setting. Let Y denote the
output of the consumption good. Technology is represented by a production
function,
Y = F(K,L),
where K and L denote the inputs of capital and labor respectively. We
assume that the production function is constant returns to scale. The capital
input K equals the total endowment of capital Nk. Let FL denote the
marginal product of labor. The labor input is determined by the following
ﬁrst order condition,
FL(Nk,L) = w.
Solving this condition for L, we have the labor demand function Ld = Ld(w).
Since the marginal product of labor is declining in the labor input, the labor
demand is decreasing in the wage rate.
The labor supply of each household is given by (1 − βn). Using (3), we
can derive the total supply of labor as







It can be easily shown that the total supply of labor is increasing in the wage









Finally, the rental rate for capital is determined by the competitive condition
for the good market. Let c(w,r) denote the unit cost function of the con-
sumption good. Since the market for the consumption good is competitive,
the unit cost equals the price, which is one, at equilibrium.
1 = c(w,r). (11)
Let we and re denote the equilibrium wage and rental rate. Solving the
conditions (10) and (11) simultaneously, we obtain we and re.
3.2 Equilibrium in an Open Economy
Let us consider a situation in which good trade and capital mobility are
allowed in the economy. Suppose that the rental rate at autarky is smaller
than the rental rate at the world capital market, i.e. re < r∗. Then, the
economy has a comparative advantage in capital and it would export capital
for the import of the consumption good. We assume that the economy is a
small country so that the domestic rental rate is determined by the world
rental rate r∗. Since the economy exports capital, the capital inputs used in
domestic production would be smaller than the endowment of capital, i.e.




where FK is the marginal product of capital. Substituting the world rental
rate r∗ into the competitive condition (11), we can derive the wage rate at
trade equilibrium. Let w(r∗) denote the equilibrium wage rate. The total
supply of labor is determined by the equilibrium wage rate and the world









Substituting (13) into (12), we can obtain the input demand for capital at









= Y + r
∗(kN − K).
The last equality implies that trade is balanced since cN −Y = r∗(kN −K).
The consumption of each household is determined so that the value of import
of the consumption good can equal the value of export of capital.
3.3 The Eﬀect of Declining Population
Suppose that the number of households declines. Then, for the given wage
rate, the total supply of labor decreases, and this puts upward pressure on
the wage rate. For domestic producers to stay competitive, the domestic
rental rate would fall to absorb the increase in the wage rate. This leads to
the expansion of capital exports since foreign investment is more proﬁtable.
As a result, the output of domestic production declines, i.e. “hollowing out”
occurs in the economy.
Also, as we have already shown, a decline in the number of households
reduces the demand for children since the weaker network eﬀect increases the
cost of child rearing.
In sum, a decline in the population of households leads to a “shortage”
of the total labor supply, and as a result, it induces an increase in capital
exports and a reduction in domestic production. The “shortage” would not
necessarily be recovered since the demand for children decreases due to the
weaker network eﬀect.
103.4 The Eﬀect of a Foreign Investment Boom
Suppose that the world rental rate r∗ rises for some reason. This results
in a surge in foreign investment since it is more proﬁtable than domestic
investment. The capital outﬂows raise the domestic rental rate. Then, the
competitive condition (11) implies that the wage rate falls to make the do-
mestic production competitive in the world market. The decline in the wage
rate reduces the opportunity cost of child rearing. Also, the nominal income
of each household rises due to the higher returns of capital. Thus, both sub-
stitution and income eﬀects have positive impacts on the demand for children
in each household.
In sum, if the domestic capital market is integrated into the world market,
an increase in the world rental rate results in the expansion of capital exports.
This reallocation of capital reduces the output of domestic production, and
thus the wage rate falls in the labor market. The fall in the wage rate leads to
a decline in the opportunity cost of child rearing, and increasing the demand
for children. The increase in the rental rate also induces each household
to have more children by making them wealthier. Thus, a surge in foreign
investment may lead to “hollowing out”, but at the same time, it may results
in an increase in birthrate.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we develop a simple model to examine the network-eﬀect of
child rearing. If the net-work eﬀect exists, the cost of raising children de-
creases with the total number of children. Then, the equilibrium number
of children is too small as compared to the socially optimal value, and the
network eﬀect can magnify the decline of birthrate. The government can
provide the optimal subsidy to stimulate birthrate. In a high-wage country,
the opportunity cost of child-rearing is large for each household. Thus, the
size of the optimal subsidy would increase with income of the economy.
In a general equilibrium setting, the wage rate is determined endoge-
nously. Then, a decline in the size of population leads to the higher wage
11rate by reducing the labor supply. The rise in the wage rate leads to the
higher opportunity costs for raising children, and thus the demand for chil-
dren declines as well. In the presence of the network eﬀect, a decrease in
population can magnify the reduction in birthrate since the cost of child-
rearing increases with a decline in the size of population.
In this paper, we develop the static framework. It may be possible to
extend the model to a dynamic setting. Immigration is another aspect of
globalization. It is interesting to examine the impact of immigration on
birthrate. These are tasks for our future research.
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